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Abstract
This paper extends Hopenhayn and Rogerson’s analysis of ﬁring taxes by intro-
ducing a ﬂexible form of capital and considering transitionary dynamics. The paper
ﬁnds that capital is not important for understanding the long run and welfare eﬀects
of ﬁring taxes. However, capital is crucial for determining the short run consequences
of eliminating this type of policy.
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Iowa State University, Michigan State University, the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, University of
Rochester, University of Pennsylvania, Queens University and the 1995 Northwestern University Summer
Workshop. The views expressed here do not necessarily reﬂect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
Many countries have adopted policies that restrict the job turnover process in important
ways. Of particular interest are ﬁring restrictions, since they are commonly blamed for
the poor performance of European labor markets relative to the U.S. (see, for example,
Emerson 1988, Piore 1986, and Lazear 1990). In fact, several European countries impose
large penalties on employers for ﬁring workers: Lazear (1990) reports that, in countries such
as Italy, Norway, and Spain, the required severance payments for blue collar workers with
ten years of service exceed one year of wages.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the consequences of this type of policy. For this
purpose, a general equilibrium model of establishment dynamics is introduced, calibrated
to U.S. data, and analyzed to determine the eﬀects of ﬁring taxes. The paper is closely
related to Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), who studied the eﬀects of ﬁring taxes in a
similar framework.2 It extends their analysis by introducing a ﬂexible form of capital and
considering transitionary dynamics. These extensions allow the paper to analyze the short
run eﬀects of ﬁring taxes (in addition to the long run eﬀects), and to explore the importance
of capital mobility on the eﬀects of ﬁring taxes. Since transitionary dynamics are explicitly
considered, the paper is also able to provide a more accurate estimate of the welfare cost of
ﬁring restrictions.3
The economy considered is similar to the neoclassical growth model except for output,
which is produced by a large number of establishments subject to idiosyncratic productivity
2An earlier investigation, by Bentolila and Bertola (1990), used a partial equilibrium model to study the
consequences of ﬁring and hiring costs in the labor demand of a monopolist.
3Similarly to Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), the paper abstracts from any potential beneﬁts of ﬁring
restrictions, focusing on the costs. An analysis that allows for potential beneﬁts is found in Alvarez and
Veracierto (1998), who study the eﬀects of ﬁring restrictions in an economy plagued with reallocation frictions
and market imperfections.
1shocks that induce them to expand and contract over time. Introducing ﬁring taxes dis-
torts the job turnover process by making establishments less willing to hire and ﬁre workers.
This creates a production ineﬃciency that induces agents to substitute away from the mar-
ket sector towards home activities, reducing aggregate employment and decreasing capital
accumulation. The purpose of the quantitative analysis of the paper is to determine the
magnitude of these eﬀects.
There are three reasons why introducing capital mobility and transitionary dynamics
could aﬀect the analysis of ﬁring taxes. First, if labor and capital were close substitutes and
capital were freely movable, establishments could easily use capital in place of labor to adjust
to changes in their idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Under those circumstances, the dis-
tortions that ﬁring taxes introduce in the adjustment process would be less severe.4 Second,
dynamic capital accumulation decisions could amplify these distortions quite substantially.
In particular, output would fall not only because of the direct eﬀects of these distortions,
but also because of their indirect eﬀects on investment. Third, the welfare gains of removing
the ﬁring restrictions could be considerably smaller: resources would be needed along the
transition path to accumulate the larger stock of capital and number of establishments at the
steady state without interventions. While the ﬁrst and third reasons for introducing capital
and transitional dynamics work towards delivering lower eﬀects of ﬁring taxes, the second
reason works in opposite direction. As a consequence, analysis is needed to determine which
eﬀect will dominate.
Similarly to Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), the paper ﬁnds that ﬁring taxes equal to
one year of wages have large long run eﬀects: they decrease steady state output, capital, con-
sumption, and wages by 7.84 percent, and steady state employment by 6.62 percent. When
4In a diﬀerent context, Caballero and Hamour (1998) emphasize the importance of the elasticity of sub-
stitution between capital and labor (at diﬀerent time horizons) for understanding the evolution of European
labor markets. They argue that it played a crucial role in determining the ability of labor for appropriating
speciﬁc quasi-rents from capital.
2the analysis is restricted to steady state comparisons, a ﬁring tax of this magnitude decreases
welfare by 3.22 percent, in terms of consumption. As expected, considering transitional dy-
namics reduces this estimate, but only to 2.82 percent. The paper ﬁnds that the transitionary
dynamics are rather fast: the long run eﬀects dominate the welfare consequences of ﬁring
taxes.
To explore the role of capital in the analysis, ﬁring restrictions are introduced in a version
of the model without capital. The paper ﬁnds that the steady state eﬀects of ﬁring taxes are
similar in both economies, suggesting that capital is not crucial for understanding the long
run eﬀects of ﬁring taxes. However, capital aﬀects in important ways the short run response
of the economy to removing the ﬁring restrictions. In particular, it generates transitional
dynamics that are absent when capital is not present. Moreover, the elasticity of substi-
tution between capital and labor plays an important role in determining the shape of the
transitional dynamics that the model generates. Furthermore, the paper ﬁnds that capital
accumulation plays a crucial role in amplifying the initial productivity gains of removing
the ﬁring restrictions. In fact, the ampliﬁcation eﬀect is so large that ﬁring taxes end up
producing somewhat larger long run eﬀects in the economy with capital, despite the smaller
distortions in the adjustment process.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy, Section 3
describes a competitive equilibrium with ﬁring taxes, Section 4 calibrates the model to
U.S. observations, Section 5 examines the eﬀects of ﬁring taxes in the benchmark economy,
provides a sensitivity analysis, and explores the role of capital in the results obtained, Section
6 concludes the paper. An algorithm to compute equilibria is provided in the Appendix.
2. The model economy
The framework is similar to the neoclassical growth model except for the production technol-
ogy, which delivers the following features: a determinate size and number of establishments,
3heterogeneity across establishments, individual establishments which expand and contract
over time, and entry and exit of establishment. A full description of the environment follows.
The economy is populated by a measure one of ex-ante identical inﬁnitely lived agents.





t [logct + v(lt)]
where ct and lt are consumption and leisure, and 0 < β < 1 is the subjective time discount
factor. The time endowment of each agent is equal to ω. There is an institutionally deter-
mined workweek of ﬁxed length which is normalized to one, so leisure can only take values
of ω or ω − 1. This assumption delivers a determinate number of workers at each plant, so
that changes in the labor input at an establishment can be identiﬁed with changes in the
number of workers employed.
In every period output is produced by a large number of establishments. Each establish-
ment uses capital kt and labor nt as inputs in the following production function:










where st is an idiosyncratic productivity shock, g is the steady state growth rate of the
economy, θ > 0, γ > 0, θ + γ < 1,a n dρ < 1. This production function displays constant
elasticity of substitution 1
1−ρ, constant elasticity of scale θ+γ, and is consistent with steady
state growth. When ρ =0 , it reduces to the following Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation:






Under free entry, the decreasing returns to scale implied by θ + γ < 1 would lead to an
inﬁnite number of establishments of inﬁnitesimal size. The introduction of a ﬁxed entry
5Preferences are restricted to be separable in consumption and leisure for computational reasons. Among
separable utility functions, log ct was chosen because it is the only functional form consistent with steady
state growth. For a time period equal to one quarter, log preferences imply an empirically reasonable
elasticity of intertemporal substitution as well.
4cost below will preclude this possibility, and will generate a well deﬁned size distribution of
establishments.
The idiosyncratic shock st follows a stochastic process that is common to all establish-
ments. Realizations are independent across establishments and take values in the set
Ω = {0} ∪ [1,∞).
The shock st follows a ﬁrst order Markov process with transition function Q,w h e r e
Q(s,S) is the probability that st+1 ∈ S conditional on st = s. This process is assumed to
be such that starting from any initial value, with probability one st reaches zero in ﬁnite
time, and that once st reaches zero, there is zero probability that st will receive a positive
value in the future. Given these assumptions, it is natural to identify a zero value for the
productivity shock with the death of an establishment. Since there are no ﬁxed costs to
operate an establishment already created, exit will take place only when the idiosyncratic
productivity shock takes a value of zero.6
New establishments can be created through an entrepreneurial activity. Even though
agents are ex-ante identical in every period, ex-post they diﬀer in their entrepreneurial
abilities. Every period, an agent receives an entrepreneurial ability ξ randomly drawn from
a distribution µ. These draws are independent across agents. If an agent of ability ξ spends a
full workweek in the entrepreneurial activity, ξ new establishments are created the following
period. The initial productivity shock st of a newly created establishment is randomly drawn
from a distribution ψ. These draws are independent across establishments as well. Observe
that the entrepreneurial input will act as an entry cost and lead to a well determined size of
establishments.
6An alternative would be to introduce a ﬁxed cost to operate a plant (as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson
1993) and solve for a threshold productivity level under which establishments decide to exit. The main
advantage of the current formulation is that it allows for the computation of transitionary dynamics, which
is a central issue analyzed in this paper.






This function gives the maximum number of new establishments that can be obtained when
af r a c t i o nν of the popultation of agents is ex-post allocated to the entrepreneurial activity.
Clearly, the maximum number of establishments is obtained when only the (ex-post) most
able entrepreneurs are selected. Rather than postulating a functional form for µ, the following
functional form for A(.) will be assumed:
A(ν)=ν
ϕ (2.2)
where 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1.
Notice that when ϕ =1all agents are exactly the same in terms of their abilities to
create new establishments (ξ is equal to one for every agent). On the contrary, when ϕ =
0 the creation of establishments is independent of the number of agents allocated to the
entrepreneurial activity (that is, new establishments arrive exogenously).7
Output can be either consumed or invested. There is a standard linear technology to
accumulate capital given by
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + It
where Kt is capital, It is investment and δ is the depreciation rate.
To determine the feasibility of an allocation, we must keep track of the number of es-
tablishments at each productivity level. Letting νt be the number of agents that become
entrepreneurs at date t, the measure of establishments across productivity levels xt satisﬁes




7Allowing for heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability may play an important role for oﬀ-steady-state dy-
namics, since A(ν) will act as an adjustment cost function for creating new establishments.
6for all S. This equation states that the next period’s measure of establishments with shocks in
the set S is given by the number of establishments that transit from their current productivity
shocks to a shock in S, and the number of establishments created next period with a shock
in S.








These expressions are obtained by adding the labor inputs nt(s) and capital inputs kt(s)
across all establishments in the economy.
Aggregate consumption feasibility is then given by
ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt ≤
Z
ft [s,kt(s),n t(s)]xt(ds) (2.6)
In words, aggregate consumption plus aggregate investment cannot exceed the sum of output
levels across all establishments in the economy.
Given some initial conditions x0 and K0, an allocation is feasible if it satisﬁes equations
(2.3), (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6) at all dates. From these feasibility conditions and the produc-
tion function (2.1) it is straightforward to verify that along any steady state growth path: 1)
aggregate consumption ct, aggregate capital Kt, and the capital input at each type of estab-
lishment kt(s) grow at the technological growth rate g, and 2) aggregate employment η,t h e
total number of entrepreneurs ν, the measure of establishments across productivity levels x,
and the labor input at each type of establishment n(s) are constant over time.8 Notice that
even though individual establishments are continuously expanding, contracting, dying and
8Existence of a steady state growth path requires that the ﬁxed entry cost grow at the rate g (the rate of
technological progress). Modeling the entry cost as being an entrepreneurial input is a natural choice, since
the theory implies that wages will grow exactly at this rate along a balanced growth path. An alternative
7being created, the employment size distribution of establishments remains constant along a
steady state growth path. This is consistent with an important observation regarding the
U.S. economy: average establishment size (in terms of employment) shows no tendency to
increase or decrease over long periods of time.9
It is possible to transform the economy (by redeﬁning preferences and technology appro-
priately) so that its steady state growth path exhibits zero growth. Since this is a standard
procedure in the growth literature, the details are left to the reader. In what follows, it is
assumed that the economy has already been transformed in this manner. In particular, the







3. Competitive equilibrium with ﬁring taxes
This section considers a competitive equilibrium where establishments are taxed for reducing
their employment levels. Following Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), it is assumed that the
proceeds of the ﬁring taxes are rebated as lump sum transfers to households by the gov-
ernment. In the presence of ﬁring costs, the ﬁrms’ maximization problem becomes dynamic
because current employment decisions aﬀect future tax liabilities. For simplicity, we describe
steady state competitive equilibria only. A discussion of the transitionary dynamics will be
provided later on.
The individual state of an establishment is given by its current productivity shock s
and its previous employment level e. Establishments seek to maximize expected discounted
modeling strategy would be to impose an entry cost in the form of a ﬁxed amount of goods. A problem
with this formulation is that steady state growth would require this ﬁxed input requirement of goods to
exogenously grow at the rate g. Clearly, there would be no theoretical justiﬁcation for such an assumption.
9This observation comes from Census of Manufacturers data between 1947 to 1982.
8proﬁts net of ﬁring taxes. The steady state proﬁt maximization problem of an establishment
of type (e,s) is described by the following dynamic programming problem:
V (e,s)=m a x
½









where w is the wage rate, r is the rental price of capital, and i is the interest rate. Note
that whenever current employment n is lower than the previous period’s employment e,t h e
establishment must pay a factor τ of the wage rate per unit reduction in employment.10
Every period, households purchase consumption, capital, and new establishments, and
receive income from the rental of capital, the supply of labor and entrepreneurial services,
the proﬁts of the establishments that they own, and the lump sum transfers from the gov-
ernment. Following Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), households are assumed to trade
lotteries. Trading is assumed to occur before the realizations of entrepreneurial abilities.
The lotteries traded are contracts that specify probabilities (conditional on the realization
of the entrepreneurial ability) of working or becoming an entrepreneur, and allow agents to
perfectly diversify the risk that they face.
The steady state problem of a household with capital K and establishment ownership
given by a measure x over establishment types, is described by the following functional
equation:





0 − (1 − δ)K ≤ wη + rK + T +
Z





Q(s,S)x(de × ds)+A(ν)ψ(S)κE (0) (3.4)
10Observe that establishment must pay the tax on employment reduction when they shut down. This
corresponds with actual practice (see Lazear 1990, p. 708).
9where η is the probability of becoming a worker, ν is the probability of becoming an en-
trepreneur, π(e,s) are the one-period proﬁts of an establishment of type (e,s),a n dT are
the lump sum transfers from the government. Observe that households’ preferences become
linear with respect to the probability of working η and becoming an entrepreneur ν due to
the trading in lotteries.11 Equation (3.3) represents the budget constraint. Equation (3.4)
gives the next period ownership of establishments x0 as a function of the current period
ownership x and the probability of becoming an entrepreneur ν. The second term in this
expression takes into account that agents trade the entrepreneurship lotteries at actuarially
fair prices. The expression κE (0) is an indicator function that is equal to one if 0 ∈ E,a n d
is equal to zero otherwise (note that new establishments arrive with zero employment from
the previous period).
At steady state, the aggregate state of the economy (K∗,x ∗) and equilibrium prices
{i∗,r∗,w ∗} are constant over time. Establishments solve equation (3.1) taking equilibrium
prices as given, and generate decision rules n∗(e,s) and k∗(e,s) for employment and capi-
tal, and one-period proﬁts π∗(e,s). Households solve equation (3.2) taking establishments’
decisions, equilibrium prices, and equilibrium lump-sum transfers as given. At steady state,
the representative household with individual state (K∗,x ∗) chooses K0 = K∗ and x0 = x∗ for
the following period. Associated with these decisions are (constant) choices of consumption
c∗,l a b o rη∗, and entrepreneurship ν∗. At equilibrium, the markets for capital, labor, and





















11In particular, α is given by v(ω) − v(ω − 1).
10By Walras Law, it can be veriﬁed that the lump sum transfers T∗ e q u a lt h et a xr e v e n u e so f
the government.
The only transitionary dynamics that this paper will analyze correspond to the economy
with no ﬁring taxes. Under no interventions, the welfare theorems hold and the competitive
equilibrium allocation can be obtained as the solution to a social planner’s problem with
equal weights. The Appendix describes how to compute this social planner’s problem as well
as steady state equilibria.
4. Calibration
Parameter values are selected so that the steady state of the model economy reproduces
several important features of U.S. data. Since U.S. labor markets are ﬂexible compared to
most European counterparts, ﬁring restrictions are set to zero when calibrating to the U.S.
economy.
The ﬁrst issue to address is what actual measure of capital will the model capital corre-
spond to. Since we are interested in establishment level dynamics, we abstract from capital
components such as land, residential structures, and consumer durables. In particular, the
empirical counterpart for capital is identiﬁed with plant and equipment, and is associated in
the National Income and Product Accounts with non-residential investment. On the other
hand, the empirical counterpart for consumption is identiﬁed with personal consumption ex-
penditures in non-durable goods and services. Output is then deﬁned to be the sum of these
investment and consumption measures. The quarterly capital-output and investment-output
ratios that correspond to these measures are 6.8 and 0.15 respectively.12
At steady state, investment is just enough to replenish capital from growth-adjusted
12Empirical measures for plant and equipment were obtained from Diaz-Gimenez, et al. (1992) for the
years 1959, 1975 and 1986. The numbers reported in the text are the quarterly equivalent capital-output








Setting g =0 .0039 (the average quarterly growth rate in GNP per capita between 1954 and
1992) the above capital-output and investment-output ratios imply a depreciation rate δ
equal to 0.01816.
Mehra and Prescott (1985) report that between 1889 and 1978 the average annual real
return on equity was 7 percent, while the average annual real return on short-term debt was






The discount factor β is then selected to be 0.994 to reproduce this annual interest rate.
For the benchmark economy, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is
set to one. Under this Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation, the share of labor in National Income is
given by the technology parameter γ, which is consequently set at 0.64, the value implicit in
the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.
The capital share θ is related to the interest rate i, the depreciation rate δ and the
capital-output ratio as follows:




Using the above values for the interest rate, the depreciation rate of capital, and the capital-
output ratio, leads to a θ equal to 0.19. The share of National Income going to owners of
establishments is then 1 − θ − γ =0 .17.
The preference parameter α is selected so that 80 percent of the population is employed,
roughly the fraction of the working age population that is employed in the U.S. economy.
The curvature parameter ϕ is selected small enough so that the number of entrepreneurs in
13Also, this is the value commonly used in the real business cycles literature.
12the economy is 1/100 the number of workers. Even though there is no data on the number
of entrepreneurs in the U.S. economy, it seems reasonable to impose a small number relative
to the number of workers.14 Nevertheless, we will report results under diﬀerent curvature
parameters ϕ.
The remaining parameters pertain to the distribution function over initial productivity






Pr{(a + φlns + ε
0) ∈ [1,e s]},f o rs,e s ≥ 1
where a, φ,a n dµ are constants, and ε0 is an i.i.d. normally distributed variable with mean
0 and standard deviation σ. This is basically an AR(1) process truncated at the value of 0.
In computations the idiosyncratic productivity shocks must take a ﬁnite number of values.
This means that we must decide the number of points and values for s to include in the ﬁnite
grid. The number of parameters to determine in ψ will clearly depend on the number of
points in the ﬁnite grid. On the other hand, there are four parameters that characterize the
transition function Q: a, φ, µ,a n dσ. The actual transition matrix used in computations
will be a ﬁnite approximation of Q over the grid points. Since all these parameters are
important determinants of the establishment dynamics of the model, their values are selected
to reproduce several features of U.S. establishment dynamics.
One such feature is the distribution of establishments by employment size. The Census
of Manufacturers is a rich source of information, providing the number of establishments
across several employment ranges in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Since the census reports
data for nine employment ranges, a grid of nine positive values for the productivity shocks
is chosen. The values are selected so that the (corresponding nine types of) establishments
14In a stochastic version of this economy, a small curvature parameter ϕ is also crucial for obtaining
empirically reasonable cyclical behavior of job-creation and job-destruction rates (see Veracierto 1996).
13in the model economy display employment levels in the middle of each of the employment
ranges reported by the Census of Manufacturers. The distribution over initial productivity
shocks ψ is then selected so that the invariant distribution x in the model economy mimics
the average size distribution of manufacturing establishments across the census years of 1967,
1972, 1977, and 1982, which is reproduced in the upper portion of Table 2.
Another set of observations on (manufacturing) establishment dynamics concerns “job-
creation” and “job-destruction” data. Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) deﬁned “job-creation
(destruction) between periods t and t+1”t ob et h es u mo fe m p l o y m e n ti n c r e a s e s( d e c r e a s e s )
across all establishments that expand (contract) between periods t and t+1, divided by the
average employment level in the manufacturing sector between periods t and t +1 .J o b -
creation (JC) was further split into employment increases due to births of establishments
(JCB), and employment increases due to continuing establishments (JCC). Similarly, job-
destruction (JD) was split into employment decreases due to deaths of establishments (JDD),
and employment decreases due to continuing establishments (JDC). Davis and Haltiwanger
reported quarterly values for job-creation and job-destruction corresponding to data from
the Longitudinal Research Dataﬁle. Their mean values for the period between 1972:2 and
1988:4 are reported in the upper portion of Table 2.
A last observation used is the ﬁve-years exit rate of manufacturing establishments.
Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) performed an empirical study of establishment turnover
using data on plants that ﬁrst began operating in the 1967, 1972, or 1977 Census of Man-
ufacturers. The ﬁve-year exit rate among these plants was found to be 36.2 percent. The
parameters characterizing the transition function Q (mainly, a, φ, µ and σ)a r ec h o s e n
to reproduce this ﬁve years exit rate together with the quarterly “job-creation” and “job-
destruction” rates reported in Table 2.
The time period of the model economy is selected to be one quarter. Parameters corre-
sponding to this choice of time period are listed in Table 1. The lower portion of Table 2
14displays steady state values. Table 2 shows that the model economy does a reasonable job
in mimicking U.S. establishment dynamics.
5. Results
Table 3 reports how the steady-state of the benchmark economy is aﬀected by the intro-
duction of ﬁring taxes equivalent to one quarter (τ =1 )a n do n ey e a ro fw a g e s( τ =4 ).15
Before moving to the results, it should be noted that the equilibrium without interventions
is Pareto optimal. As a consequence, introducing ﬁring penalties will only decrease welfare
levels.16
Table 3 shows that both steady state allocations and prices are substantially aﬀected by
the introduction of ﬁring restrictions: ﬁring taxes equal to one year of wages reduce steady
state consumption, output, capital, and wages by 7.84 percent, the number of workers by
6.62 percent, and the number of entrepreneurs by 2.77 percent.17 These are exactly the type
of eﬀects which opponents of ﬁring restrictions are concerned about, and we ﬁnd them to be
quantitatively very important.
Also reported are summary statistics on how the employment creation and destruction
p r o c e s si sa ﬀected by the introduction of ﬁring taxes. The average employment size of
establishments decreases from 61.72 to 57.74 when τ goes from 0 to 4, while the variances
of employment and capital levels across establishments increase from 1.36 to 1.46 and 1.37,
respectively. For continuing establishments, the serial correlations of employment and capital
15Preference and technology parameters are those selected in the previous section.
16Even though workers are employed or not, depending on the outcome of the lotteries that they trade,
these same contracts allow them to perfectly diversify this risk. In particular, the introduction of lotteries
precludes the possibility that ﬁring penalties reduce any uninsurable mobility costs incurred by workers.
17Firing taxes equal to one year of wages are about the same magnitude as the largest severance payments
observed in actual countries (see Lazear 1990).
15increase from 0.974 to about 0.991, and the variances of employment and capital growth rates
decrease from 0.072 to about 0.027.
Figure 1 displays the employment decision rules of establishments subject to a same pro-
ductivity shock, before and after the introduction of the ﬁring taxes. Without ﬁring penalties,
current employment decisions are independent of previous employment levels. With ﬁring
penalties, employment decisions are characterized by a lower and an upper bound. If pre-
vious employment is smaller (greater) than the lower (upper) bound, current employment
is adjusted to the lower (upper) bound. If previous employment is between these lower and
upper bounds, current employment does not change. Current employment is increasing with
previous period employment because establishments try to postpone the tax payment on
employment reduction.
These decision rules provide some intuition on the reported changes in the statistics
summarizing the employment creation and destruction process. The increase in the variance
of employment across establishments is due to the fact that establishments with identical
current productivity shocks chose diﬀerent employment levels in the presence of ﬁring taxes,
whereas they would choose identical employment levels in the absence of such taxes.18 The
increase in the serial correlation of employment and the decrease in the variance of employ-
ment growth rates are due to the fact that establishments do not adjust their employment
levels as much as without ﬁring taxes: there is a wide range of previous employment levels
in which establishments make no adjustment, and outside this range the adjustment is much
smaller than it would otherwise be. Since, under the assumed functional forms, (log) capital
is a linear function of (log) productivity and (log) current employment, capital inherits the
same properties as employment.
18That is, the variance of employment levels within establishment groups with identical productivity shocks
becomes positive with the introduction of ﬁring taxes. An oﬀsetting eﬀect is that the variance of average
employment levels across establishment groups with diﬀerent productivity shocks decreases. For τ =4this
last eﬀect is not large enough, but for τ =1it dominates the ﬁrst eﬀect, and the variance actually decreases.
16Figure 2 shows capital-labor ratios as a function of previous employment. We see that for
the range where establishments do not adjust their employment levels, the capital-labor ratio
is a decreasing function of previous employment. Even though capital increases together with
employment in this range, there is a substitution from capital to labor in order to avoid the
tax on employment reduction.
A priori, it is not clear whether the welfare gains of removing these ﬁring penalties will be
large or not: agents are able to consume substantially more at the steady state without taxes,
but they also have to work substantially more. Table 3 reports the percentage consumption
increase, uniform across all dates, needed to give agents in the steady state of the economy
with τ =4the same welfare level as agents in the steady state of the economy with τ =0 .
Using this welfare measure, the gain from removing the tax on employment reduction is
computed to be 3.22 percent.
Welfare conclusions reached from steady state comparisons can easily be misleading since
they ignore the consequences of transitional dynamics. For the economy considered here,
capital and the number of establishments are larger in the steady state with τ =0 .I no r d e r
to build this extra capital and create establishments, some consumption and leisure must
be sacriﬁced along the transition to the steady state without taxes. This means that the
welfare gain obtained above actually overstates the gain of removing the tax on employment
reduction. To explore the magnitude of this eﬀect it is necessary to compute the transition
path between steady states. Figure 3 reports the transition paths for capital, consumption,
output, entry of new establishments, entrepreneurs, and workers from the steady state with
ﬁring taxes to the one without.19 Once this transitionary dynamics is considered, the welfare
gain from removing the tax on employment reduction drops to 2.82 percent. Even though
19The choice of going from the steady state with ﬁring restrictions to the steady state without was done
for computational reasons: computing the transitionary dynamics in this direction only requires solving the
Social Planner’s problem described in the Appendix.
17this welfare estimate is lower than the one obtained in the steady state comparison, it is still
a large number. The transitionary dynamics are fast enough that they do not overturn the
welfare results quite substantially.
The rest of the section explores how sensitive our results are to diﬀerent speciﬁcations
about the degree of heterogeneity in entrepreneurial skills, the substitutability of capital for
labor, and the share of capital. The objective is to analyze how the interactions between
capital, labor, and the creation of new establishments aﬀect our results.
5.1. Capital-labor substitution
The benchmark economy has assumed a Cobb-Douglas production function, which is the
speciﬁcation commonly used in the macroeconomic literature. However, a unit elasticity of
substitution is larger than what empirical estimates suggest: based on time series evidence
for fourteen manufacturing industries, Lucas (1969) found elasticities of substitution that
typically range between 0.3 and 0.5. In line with this evidence, we select an elasticity of
substitution equal to 0.40 (ρ = −1.5) and recalibrate other parameters to match the same
observations as the benchmark economy.20 For sake of comparison we also consider an
economy with an unrealistic elasticity of substitution equal to 2.5 (ρ =0 .60).21 The eﬀects
in these economies of a ﬁring tax equal to one year of wages are reported under the columns
“Low substitution” and “High substitution” in Table 4. To ease comparisons, the columns
“No Policy” and “Benchmark Economy” reproduce the corresponding results of Table 3.22
We see from Table 4 that the long run eﬀects on allocations are virtually independent of
20This requires setting γ =0 .0012 and θ =0 .8288 to match the observed labor share in national income and
the capital-output ratio. All other parameters, including the idiosyncratic shocks process, are left unchanged.
21Recalibrating this economy requires setting γ =0 .7426 and θ =0 .0874.
22Note that the laissez-faire equilibria of all these economies are exactly the same, since they were calibrated
to identical observations.
18the degree of substitution between capital and labor. This is a surprising result: intuition
suggests that a high elasticity of substitution could oﬀset the negative eﬀects of ﬁring restric-
tions by allowing establishments to use capital more intensively in the process of adjusting
to their idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In that setting, removing ﬁring restrictions would
lead to smaller productivity gains.
Table 4 shows that the variance of capital growth rates is larger in the economy with high
elasticity of substitution and that the persistence of capital is smaller. This indicates that
establishments indeed use capital more intensively to adjust to changes in their idiosyncratic
shocks when the elasticity of substitution is high. However, the eﬃciency gains of this process
are quantitatively small.
To be precise, let Y (η,K,x) be the maximum amount of aggregate output that can be
obtained (absent ﬁring restrictions) with an aggregate number of workers η, an aggregate
stock of capital K,a n dav e c t o rx describing the measure of establishments across idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks.23 Letting ∗-variables denote steady state values corresponding to
an equilibrium with ﬁring restrictions, the ratio Y (η∗,K∗,x ∗)/Y ∗ describes the initial static
gains in output that can be obtained from removing the ﬁring restrictions while leaving the
supply of factors of production unchanged. Table 4 shows that in the economy with high
elasticity of substitution the static eﬃciency gain is 2.17 percent, while in the economy with
low elasticity of substitution the gain is 2.25 percent. Thus, a high elasticity of substitu-
tion does allow the economy to operate closer to its production possibility frontier, but the
diﬀerence is small.24
23This function is described by equation (A.8) in the Appendix.
24Recalibrating parameter values is important for obtaining this result. In particular, increasing the
elasticity of substitution while leaving all other parameters at their benchmark values leads to substantially
smaller eﬀects of ﬁring taxes. The reason is that the capital-output ratio becomes four times larger than
in the benchmark economy (and the data) while employment becomes four times smaller. In this almost
“pure capital” economy, ﬁring taxes generate a static ineﬃciency of only 0.18 percent. In recalibrating the
19While these small static eﬃciency diﬀerences lead to small diﬀerences in long run al-
locations, the short run dynamics of these economies critically depend on the elasticity of
substitution. Figures 4 and 5 display the transitionary dynamics of both economies. We
observe that when the elasticity of substitution is small, employment does not increase on
impact as much. The reason is that with a ﬁxed initial stock of capital (and a low elasticity
of substitution), a large increase in employment does not produce a substantial increase in
output. This induces a weak employment response which in turn leads to a weak response
in aggregate output. Observe that in the economy with low substitution output undershoots
its new steady state level, while in the economy with high elasticity of substitution output
overshoots it.
With a low elasticity of substitution, capital must increase together with labor in order to
attain the eﬃciency gains of removing the ﬁring restrictions. This requires a sharp increase
in investment and a consequent sacriﬁce in consumption. In fact, Figure 4 shows that
consumption stays well below its new steady state level for a long period of time compared
to the economy with a high elasticity of substitution. As a counterpart, the stock of capital
converges much more rapidly.
In both economies, the creation of new establishments increases by a small amount.
The reason is that the benchmark value for the curvature parameter ϕ generates a sharp
degree of heterogeneity in entrepreneurial skills. As a consequence, increasing the number
of entrepreneurs cannot substantially increase the creation of new establishments. The next
section analyzes the role of this parameter.
economy we increased the need for labor by increasing the parameter γ. This shifted the burden back into
labor, increasing the ineﬃciency of ﬁring taxes.
205.2. Heterogeneity in entrepreneurial skills
We now consider an economy with low heterogeneity in entrepreneurial skills. In particular,
we set the curvature parameter, ϕ, in equation (2.2) to 0.60, ten times larger than its
benchmark value. This leads to a large steady state ratio of entrepreneurs to workers: roughly
one entrepreneur for every 10 workers, instead of one entrepreneur for every 100 workers in
the benchmark case. Other parameters are recalibrated to match the same observations as
the benchmark economy. Table 4 shows the results under the column “Low Heterogeneity”.
We see that with the higher value of ϕ ﬁring taxes decrease the number of establishments
by a much larger amount: 1.65 percent versus 0.17 percent in the benchmark case.25 As a
consequence, the eﬀects on consumption, output, capital, and wages are larger, but not by
an important amount: these variables decrease by 8.13 percent compared to 7.84 percent
in the benchmark case. The reason why the large eﬀect in the number of establishments
created does not translate into a large eﬀect in output, is that the returns to scale at the
establishments level are close to constant (γ + θ =0 .83).
Figure 6 shows the transitionary dynamics corresponding to the economy with low en-
trepreneurial heterogeneity (high ϕ). We observe that a big diﬀerence with the benchmark
case is that the number of establishments created increases quite sharply on impact. How-
ever, the initial response of output and labor are almost identical to the benchmark economy.
The sharp increase in the number of establishments created does not lead to a noticeable
eﬀect in the initial response of output or employment because the initial productivity of the
new establishments is quite low. It takes time for these establishments to transit to large
productivity levels and aﬀect aggregate output.
From these experiment we conclude that the degree of heterogeneity in entrepreneurial
25This larger response in the number of establishments created can be generated with a smaller response
in the number of entrepreneurs (2.73 percent, versus 2.77 percent in the benchmark economy) because
entrepreneurial skills are more similar than in the benchmark case.
21abilities is not important either for the long run or the short run eﬀects of ﬁring taxes.
5.3. An economy without capital
To analyze how important the presence of physical capital is for the results, this section
considers an economy without capital, one where the capital share θ is set to zero.26 Since
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) analyzed a similar case, this economy is referred to as H-R
hereon.27 The column “H-R” in Table 4 reports results for this economy.
We see that the long-run eﬀects of ﬁring restrictions are quite similar in the H-R and
benchmark economies. A ﬁring tax equal to one year of wages reduces steady state con-
sumption, output and wages by 7.47 percent in the H-R economy, while it decreases them
by 7.84 percent in the benchmark economy. The eﬀects on establishment creation are also
similar: 0.08 percent in the H-R economy versus 0.17 percent in the benchmark economy.
The main diﬀerence is with employment: in the H-R economy ﬁring taxes reduce the number
of workers by 8.14 percent, while in the benchmark economy the corresponding number is
6.62 percent.
Since consumption in the H-R economy decreases by less than it does in the benchmark
economy and employment decreases by more, the welfare cost is smaller: 2.56 percent in the
H-R economy versus 3.22 percent in the benchmark case. Considering transitional dynamics
leaves the welfare cost unchanged at 2.56 percent in the H-R economy, while decreases it to
26Values for the idiosyncratic shocks s were modiﬁed so establishments chose exactly the same employ-
ment levels as in the benchmark economy. The initial distribution ψ and the transition matrix Q were left
unchanged since they gave rise to exactly the same job-creation and job-destruction rates and size distri-
bution as in the benchmark economy. The leisure parameter α was also altered to replicate the labor force
participation.
27The H-R economy is not exactly the same as Hopenhayn and Rogerson’s. In the H-R economy: exit is
exogenously determined, the technology to create establishments requires work eﬀort instead of a ﬁxed input
of goods, there is technological growth, and the time period is one quarter instead of 5 years
222.82 percent in the benchmark economy.28
Observe that when ﬁring restrictions are introduced in the H-R economy, establishments
do not have an alternative factor of production that they can use to adjust to their shocks.
As a consequence the static gains from removing the ﬁring taxes are larger: 2.32 percent
versus 2.23 percent in the benchmark economy. This larger static gain do not produce larger
long run eﬀects because of the dramatically diﬀerent dynamic responses of both economies.
As Figure 7 shows, the H-R economy displays no transitionary dynamics at all. Similar to
the benchmark economy, the large amount of heterogeneity in entrepreneurial skills creates a
substantial adjustment cost in the creation of new establishments. As a result, the creation of
establishments does not change signiﬁcantly when the ﬁring restrictions are removed. Since
the number of establishments across idiosyncratic shocks is the only state variable in the
H-R economy, this gives rise to the lack of transitionary dynamics. All the adjustment is in
a large permanent increase in the supply of labor which increases output far more than the
initial 2.32 percent increase in productivity.
The response in the benchmark economy is substantially diﬀerent. The initial increase in
productivity is smaller (only 2.23 percent) but aﬀects not only labor but capital productivity.
As a consequence, the economy invests along the transition path to increase the stock of
capital. Due both to the higher labor productivity and to the agents’ desire to smooth
consumption over time (given the higher investment undertaken), agents react on impact
28The welfare cost found in the H-R economy is about the same as that found by Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993), though the eﬀects on consumption and employment are much larger here. The main reason for this
is that the H-R economy was calibrated to quarterly job creation and destruction rates, instead of the ﬁve
years observations selected in Hopenhayn and Rogerson’s paper. Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) report that
annualized quarterly job-creation and job-destruction ﬁgures are much larger that the annual job-creation
and job-destruction ﬁgures, suggesting that the H-R economy is capturing much larger employment ﬂows
than in Hopenhayn and Rogerson’s paper. As a consequence, restricting labor mobility leads to larger eﬀects
in the H-R economy than in Hopenhayn and Rogerson’s paper.
23by substituting leisure intertemporally and increasing their supply of labor by a fairly large
amount (actually by a larger amount than in the H-R economy, even though the productivity
gain is smaller). As the stock of capital increases through time, agents do not need to work as
hard and they decrease their labor supply. On the other hand, consumption increases along
the transition path due to the increase in output and the decline in the rate of investment.
Once capital approaches its new steady state value, the eﬀect on labor is substantially
smaller than in the H-R economy, while output and consumption increase by somewhat
larger amounts.
6. Conclusions
This paper extends Hopenhayn and Rogerson´s (1993) analysis of ﬁring taxes by introducing
a ﬂexible form of capital and considering transitional dynamics. These extensions allow the
paper to study the short run consequences of ﬁring taxes and to explore the importance of
capital mobility on the eﬀects of ﬁring taxes. The welfare costs of ﬁring taxes could also be
recalculated taking into account transitionary dynamics.
The paper obtains ﬁve important results. First, considering transitional dynamics reduces
the welfare cost of ﬁring taxes, but by a small amount. The transition to the new steady
state is fast enough that the welfare consequences of ﬁring taxes are dominated by their long
run eﬀects. Second, capital is not important for understanding the long run eﬀects of ﬁring
taxes: the long run eﬀects are quite similar in an economy without capital. Third, capital
is crucial for understanding the short run eﬀects of ﬁring taxes: it generates transitional
dynamics which are absent when capital is not present. Fourth, the way that capital interacts
with labor substantially aﬀects the transitionary path. In particular, a lower elasticity of
substitution dampens the initial response of labor, output, and consumption, but leads to
a much faster rate of convergence. Fifth, capital accumulation substantially ampliﬁes the
initial productivity gains of removing the ﬁring restrictions. In fact, the long run eﬀects
24are somewhat larger in the economy with capital, despite the smaller distortions in the
establishments’ adjustment process.
The paper abstracts from potential beneﬁts of ﬁring restrictions by assuming perfect
insurance markets and frictionless reallocation of workers across establishments. As a conse-
quence, it leaves open the question of whether relaxing these assumptions could substantially
decrease the welfare costs of ﬁring restrictions. Alvarez and Veracierto (1998, 1999) analyze
this particular issue.
A. Appendix
This Appendix describes the algorithms used to compute equilibria. Steady-states and tran-
sitionary dynamics are treated separately.
A.1. Steady state









Fixing the wage rate at an arbitrary value w, the value of the diﬀerent types of estab-
lishments (as a function of w) can be obtained by solving the following equation:
V (e,s;w)=m a x
½







The solution to this problem is computed using standard recursive methods. Note that
this solution gives decision rules n(e,s;w) and k(e,s;w) as a function of w.
















Q(s,S)dx + A(ν)ψ(S)κE (0) (A.4)
where (A.1) is the free entry condition, (A.2) is that the marginal rate of substitution of
c o n s u m p t i o nf o rl e i s u r eb ee q u a lt ot h ei n v e r s eo ft h ew a g er a t e ,( A . 3 )i st h a tc o n s u m p t i o n
is equal to aggregate output minus investment, and (A.4) is the law of motion for x.
Note from (A.4) that x is proportionate to A.T h e n ,w ec a nﬁx A at an arbitrary value
A0 and w at some arbitrary value and solve (A.4) for x0 (w,A0). Substituting (A.2) in (A.3)





[f(s,k(e,s;w),n(e,s;w)) − (g + δ)k(e,s;w)]dx
0
Then, A(w)=ϕ(w,A0)A0 and x(w)=ϕ(w,A0)x0.W e c a n t h e n d e ﬁne the function
ν(w)=A−1 [A(w)],where A−1 is the inverse function of A.
















The only transitionary dynamics that this paper analyzes correspond to the economy with
no ﬁring taxes. Under no interventions, the welfare theorems hold and the competitive
equilibrium allocation is given by the solution to the social planner’s problem with equal
weights. The state of the economy is described by the aggregate stock of capital K and
the aggregate measure over establishment types x (where this measure is now deﬁned over
26idiosyncratic productivity shocks only). The planner’s problem is given by the following
Bellman equation:










where the function Y (η,K,x) solves the following static optimization problem:








that is, Y (η,K,x) is the aggregate production function of the economy, giving the maximum
aggregate output level that can be produced with η workers, K units of capital, and a measure
x over establishment types.
Once the number of idiosyncratic shocks are restricted to lie in a ﬁnite grid, the state
space in (A.5) becomes ﬁnite dimensional. The return function is then approximated about
the deterministic steady state as a quadratic function. Given that the laws of motion (A.6)
and (A.7) are linear, this leaves a linear-quadratic structure. Standard methods can then be
used to solve it.
Note that this approximation is possible since all state variables are strictly positive at
steady state. This would not be true if exit were endogenously determined.
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 α  = 0.95
  Technology
  θ  = 0.19                  γ  = 0.64             δ  = 0.01818             ϕ  = 0.06            g = 0.00388
  Productivity Shocks
  s0 = 0.00                 s1 = 1.00               s2 = 1.14               s3 = 1.32              s4 = 1.50
  s5 = 1.73                 s6 = 1.97               s7 = 2.21               s8 = 2.56              s9 = 3.06
  Transition Probabilities Parameters
   a = 0.062              φ  	σ  = 0.0447
  Distribution over Initial Productivity Shocks
  ψ  0 = 9.995e-1        ψ  1  = 2.3e-4          ψ  2 = 6.8e-5            ψ  3 = 1.6e-4        ψ 4 = 0.0
  ψ  5 = 0.0                  ψ  6  = 0.0               ψ  7 = 0.0                ψ  8 = 0.0             ψ  9 = 0.0
Transition Matrix:
1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.087 0.848 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.005 0.084 0.879 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.005 0.000 0.086 0.847 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.088 0.877 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.846 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.092 0.808 0.095 0.000 0.000
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.873 0.028 0.000
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.096 0.896 0.004
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.099 0.89631
TABLE 2
U.S. Economy:
  Average Size = 61.7     Exit Rate = 36.2%
  JCB = 0.62%   JDD = 0.83%
  JCC = 4.77%   JDC = 4.89%
Employment Shares Employment Shares
5 - 9 23.15% 250 - 499 3.86%
10 - 19 22.82% 500 - 999 1.68%
20 - 49 24.83% 1000 - 2499 0.73%
50 - 99 12.59% > 2500 0.28%
100 - 249 10.05%
Model Economy:
  Average Size = 61.72   Exit Rate = 38.5%
  JCB = 0.72%   JDD = 0.72%
  JCC = 4.80%   JDC = 4.80%
Employment Shares Employment Shares
5 - 9 26.19% 250 - 499 2.25%
10 - 19 31.67% 500 - 999 2.13%
20 - 49 20.21% 1000 - 2499 0.59%
50 - 99 13.01% > 2500 0.02%
100 - 249 3.92%32
TABLE 3
BENCHMARK ECONOMY
No Policy Firing Tax
τ  = 1
Firing Tax
τ  = 4
c 100.00 96.90 92.16
Y 100.00 96.90 92.16
K 100.00 96.90 92.16
w 100.00 96.90 92.16
η 100.00 97.21 93.38
v 100.00 99.23 97.23
A(v) 100.00 99.95 99.83
avg(n) 61.72 60.03 57.74
var(ln n) 1.36 1.25 1.46
corr(ln n′ , ln n) 0.974 0.988 0.991
var(ln n′  - ln n) 0.072 0.031 0.027
var(ln k) 1.36 1.25 1.37
corr(ln k′ , ln k) 0.974 0.986 0.990
var(ln k′  - ln k) 0.072 0.034 0.028
Static Ineff. 0.0% 0.74% 2.23%
S.S. Welfare 0.0% 1.05% 3.22%















c 100.00 92.16 92.07 92.30 91.87 92.53
Y 100.00 92.16 92.14 92.39 91.87 92.53
K 100.00 92.16 92.58 92.85 91.87 n.a.
w 100.00 92.16 92.07 92.30 91.87 92.53
η 100.00 93.38 93.26 93.44 93.39 91.86
v 100.00 97.23 97.35 97.42 97.27 98.71
A(v) 100.00 99.83 99.84 99.84 98.35 99.92
avg(n) 61.72 57.74 57.67 57.76 58.58 54.12
var(ln n) 1.36 1.46 1.45 1.49 1.46 1.30
corr(ln n′ , ln n) 0.974 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.990
var(ln n′  - ln n) 0.072 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
var(ln k) 1.36 1.37 1.41 1.31 1.37 n.a.
corr(ln k′ , ln k) 0.974 0.990 0.991 0.986 0.990 n.a.
var(ln k′  - ln k) 0.072 0.028 0.027 0.035 0.028 n.a.
Static Ineff. 0.0% 2.23% 2.25% 2.17% 2.23% 2.32%
S.S. Welfare 0.0% 3.22% 3.22% 3.10% 3.35% 2.56%
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